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I. INTRODUCTION 
Alberta Currie, a seventy-eight-year-old African-American woman, has 
voted in every election since 1956 when she was just twenty-one years old.1 
Long ago, Alberta’s grandmother instilled in her the importance of never 
missing a voting day.2 Unfortunately, the 2012 general election may have been 
Alberta’s last opportunity. Alberta does not possess a birth certificate because 
she was born at home to a midwife in the segregated South during the height of 
Jim Crow.3 For this reason, Alberta cannot obtain photo identification 
recognized under North Carolina law.4 In most states, Alberta’s lack of photo 
identification would not prevent her from exercising her right to vote. But in 
North Carolina, Alberta may never vote again, due to the state’s strict voter 
identification law enacted in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Shelby County v. Holder.5  
Although Shelby County’s critics attacked the decision as the end of the 
Voting Rights Era,6 Alberta’s circumstances demonstrate that a new war over 
the Voting Rights Act (the Act) has only just begun.7 At the heart of this 
                                                                                                                       
* J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2015. I 
would like to thank Professor Daniel P. Tokaji for reviewing early drafts of this Note and for 
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 1 Alberta Currie is the lead plaintiff in the Southern Coalition for Justice’s pending suit 
against the State of North Carolina for its controversial voter identification law enacted in 
2013. For more information on Ms. Currie, see Alberta Currie, S. COALITION FOR SOC. JUST. 
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.southerncoalition.org/alberta-currie/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7FKH-C9WX [hereinafter S. COALITION]. The North Carolina law is known 
as House Bill 589, or the Voter Information Verification Act. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381; 
see also infra Part IV.  
 2 S. COALITION, supra note 1.  
 3 Id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). As will be explained, the Court’s 
decision allowed states, formerly subject to federal preclearance requirements, to enact 
changes to voting laws without federal oversight. This cleared the way for North Carolina to 
enact a strict voter identification law that is likely to have a harmful effect on voters such as 
Alberta Currie and others. See infra Part IV. 
 6 Adam Winkler, The Supreme Court’s Ruling and the End of the Civil-Rights Era, 
DAILY BEAST (June 25, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/the-
supreme-court-s-ruling-and-the-end-of-the-civil-rights-era.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
F8JW-AT6X; see also Adam Cohen, Viewpoint: Voting-Rights Decision Spells the End of 
Fair Elections, TIME (June 25, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/06/25/voting-rights-
decision-spells-the-end-of-fair-elections/, archived at http://perma.cc/H5RA-R2GY.  
 7  See Complaint, United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:13-cv-00861-TDS-JEP (M.D. 
N.C. Sept. 30, 2013), available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/doj-nc-complaint.pdf; 
Complaint, United States v. Texas, No. 2:13-cv-00263 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2013), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/7472013822155117860058.pdf. 
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controversy is Section 4 of the Act,8 which determines the jurisdictions that 
must submit voting law changes to the federal government before these changes 
go into effect9—a contentious requirement known as preclearance.10 Among 
other reasons, the Court struck down the Act’s preclearance formula because it 
relied on outdated statistics from the 1970s.11 But the Court did not completely 
doom the future of the Voting Rights Act.12 Instead, the Court acknowledged 
that Congress could salvage preclearance by updating its formula to incorporate 
data that accurately reflect modern voting practices.13  
In the absence of congressional action, states are now free to enact changes 
to voting laws that may burden voters’ access to the polls without fear of federal 
oversight.14 In fact, North Carolina and Texas swiftly enacted controversial 
voter identification laws with stringent requirements following the Court’s 
decision in Shelby County.15 In response, the Justice Department filed civil suits 
against these states under Section 2 of the Act, which authorizes private actions 
against discriminatory voting laws.16 Moreover, the Department of Justice 
asked the courts to “bail in” these jurisdictions to preclearance under Section 3, 
which allows judges to submit jurisdictions to preclearance if intentional 
discrimination is shown.17  
                                                                                                                       
 8 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012). 
 9 See id.  
 10 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620.  
 11 Id. at 2631. Before the Court’s decision in Shelby County, others raised concerns 
over the continued viability of the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula. See Richard L. 
Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 179 (2005) (“the road to preclearance 
renewal could be a rocky one”); Victor Andres Rodríguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 After Boerne: The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 769, 
812 (2003).  
 12 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. Specifically, the Court explained, “[w]e issue 
no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft another formula 
based on current conditions. Such a formula is an initial prerequisite to a determination that 
exceptional conditions still exist justifying such an ‘extraordinary departure from the 
traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal Government.’” Id. (quoting 
Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 500–01 (1992)).  
 13 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620. 
 14 See id. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (“Congress 
designed [§ 5 preclearance] both to catch discrimination before it causes harm, and to guard 
against return to old ways. Volumes of evidence supported Congress’[s 2006] determination 
that the prospect of retrogression was real. Throwing out preclearance when it has worked 
and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your 
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”). 
 15 See Complaint, United States v. North Carolina, supra note 7, at 6; Complaint, 
United States v. Texas, supra note 7, at 3ԟ5.  
 16 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012).  
 17 While Section 3 is relatively short, its language is dense and must be read closely to 
understand its intricacies, functions, and scope. The first part provides the Attorney General 
or an aggrieved party the ability to institute an action to “enforce the voting guarantees of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision” if the court finds 
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However, the problem with Section 3’s preclearance mechanism is that its 
intentional discrimination requirement is overly burdensome for plaintiffs. In 
over forty years, only two states have been bailed in to Section 3.18 On the other 
hand, federal courts have almost never utilized Section 3 to submit jurisdictions 
to preclearance in the context of voter identification laws.19 While a great deal 
of scholarly focus has been devoted to analyzing the role of Sections 4 and 5 of 
the Act, Section 3 has received very little attention from election law scholars, 
members of Congress, and federal judges.20 Accordingly, it is unclear how 
federal courts will respond to the Obama Administration’s request to bail in 
these states to preclearance under Section 3.21  
Thus, reform is greatly needed.22 This Note challenges conventional 
wisdom by arguing that Congress should abandon Section 5 preclearance by 
                                                                                                                       
intentional discrimination has occurred, which justifies “equitable relief.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973a(c) (2012). In addition to this relief, the court “shall retain jurisdiction for such 
period as it may deem appropriate . . . .” Id. During this period, the state or local jurisdiction 
cannot enact changes to its voting laws unless the court finds that such changes do not “have 
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race or color, or in contravention of the voting guarantees set forth” under this title. Id. 
The jurisdiction’s proposed voting law changes may be enforced if the jurisdictions “chief 
legal officer or appropriate official” submits these changes to the Attorney General, and the 
Attorney General does not object to these changes within sixty days after such submission. 
Id. Finally, Section 3 provides that, “neither the court’s finding nor the Attorney General’s 
failure to object shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of” the jurisdiction’s 
proposed voting law changes. Id. 
 18 See Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 601í02 (E.D. Ark. 1990); see also Travis 
Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and 
Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2007 n.88 (2010) (citing Sanchez v. Anaya, 
No. 82-0067M, slip op. at 8 (D.N.M. Dec. 17, 1984) (consent decree)).  
 19 See Abby Rapoport, Get to Know Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act, AM. PROSPECT 
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/get-know-section-3-voting-rights-act, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6CN3-PFKN.  
 20 See Crum, supra note 18, at 2038. For information on Section 3’s pocket trigger 
provision, see infra Part II.B.3. Moreover, Crum’s Note is the only major scholarly piece 
devoted exclusively to analyzing Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act. Crum’s piece was 
written prior to the Supreme Court’s monumental decision in Shelby County.  
 21 See Rapoport, supra note 19.  
 22 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 107í08 (2014) (arguing for a “Grand Election Bargain” that 
would appease both conservatives and liberals by enacting federal legislation expanding 
opportunities for voter registration, while requiring voter identification in federal elections). 
In effect, this proposal would provide consistent national election law rules and fill the void 
left by the Supreme Court after Shelby County by continuing to expand the electorate. See id. 
Others, including members of Congress who recently introduced legislation, have argued in 
favor of updating Section 4’s preclearance formula based on Chief Justice Roberts’s 
majority opinion in Shelby County. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, 
The Geography of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance 
After Shelby County, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 57), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262954. However, others have 
proposed more idiosyncratic changes that could be made in updating the Voting Rights Act. 
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amending Section 3. Part II provides a background on the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 and the Act’s most important mechanisms. Part III reviews how federal 
courts have interpreted the Act in numerous challenges brought against state 
and local voting laws. On the other hand, Part IV more closely examines the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Shelby County. Specifically, Part IV argues that, 
based on the high standards of proving violations under Section 3, recent suits 
brought by the Department of Justice are inadequate in combating 
discriminatory voter identification laws. Part V concludes by proposing several 
amendments to Section 3 that lower the standard of proof required to submit 
jurisdictions to preclearance, clarify Section 3’s scope, and change its initial 
evidentiary burden. 
II. A BACKGROUND ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND KEY PROVISIONS 
Before addressing how federal courts have interpreted the Voting Rights 
Act, an understanding of the context that prompted Congress to pass this Act is 
necessary for comprehending the importance of the Court’s recent decision in 
Shelby County. Aside from a background on the development of the Voting 
Rights Act, an overview of the Act’s most important mechanisms for combating 
voting discrimination is also relevant to contemporary disputes over the Act’s 
continued ability to protect voters such as Alberta Currie.  
A. The Development of the Voting Rights Act 
The origins of the Voting Rights Act began in the aftermath of 
Reconstruction.23 With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 
and Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, the Constitution of the United States 
guaranteed African-American men the right to vote.24 Many African-American 
men living in the South exercised this right for several years after the 
ratification of these amendments and Southern constituencies elected African-
American political leaders.25 Both of these Amendments, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment banning slavery, include enforcement provisions that grant 
                                                                                                                       
See Edward Blum, Voting Rights and the Beneficiaries of Selma, AMERICAN (Apr. 22, 2009), 
http://www.american.com/archive/2009/june/voting-rights-and-the-beneficiaries-of-selma, 
archived at http://perma.cc/VS49-4TET (arguing for an amendment to the Voting Rights Act 
that would trigger Section 3 each time a voting rights suit is filed, requiring preclearance of 
all changes during litigation). 
 23 Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 
HOW. L.J. 785, 790 (2006).  
 24 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV.  
 25 GARTH E. PAULEY, LBJ’S AMERICAN PROMISE: THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ADDRESS 
30 (2007).    
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Congress the “power to enforce” the provisions of the Amendments by 
“appropriate legislation.”26  
Soon after, Congress utilized this enforcement power to pass the 
Enforcement Act of 1870, which made it a crime for public officials or private 
individuals to obstruct a person’s right to vote.27 Over time, concern for racial 
equality waned and enforcement of the law became rare.28 By 1894, Congress 
repealed most provisions of the Enforcement Act.29 Accordingly, the Southern 
states that formerly comprised the Confederacy began finding ways to 
circumvent the Reconstruction amendments.30 Many of these states adopted 
literacy tests, poll taxes, or restricted access to voter registration31 while 
preserving ways to allow whites to evade these heighted requirements.32 Thus, 
by the advent of the twentieth century, nearly all African-Americans were 
denied the right to vote across the southern United States and segregation 
persisted until the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.33  
During the height of the Civil Rights movement in March 1965, a few 
hundred civil rights activists decided to march from Selma, Alabama, for voting 
rights.34 However, the police killed one individual and sent seventeen others to 
the hospital after attempting to stop the march.35 As images of the police 
brutality in Selma swept across American televisions, a new conversation began 
                                                                                                                       
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIII, § 2; see also Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 
1809 (2010). These enforcement provisions were included to provide Congress with the 
power to enact laws that would preserve equal citizenship between African-Americans and 
Whites across the United States, especially when states sought to contravene the purposes of 
the Reconstruction Amendments by preventing African-Americans from voting. Id.  
 27 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966).  
 28 Id.  
 29 Id.  
 30 See Tokaji, supra note 23, at 790. In fact, Mississippi called a constitutional 
convention in 1890 solely for the purpose of disenfranchising African-Americans. GARRINE 
P. LANEY, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT 
ISSUES 3ԟ4 (2003); see also Michael Ellement, Note, The New Voter Suppression: Why the 
Voting Rights Act Still Matters, 15 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 
261, 266 (2013).  
 31  Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own 
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1711 (2004); see also DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET 
AL., ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 30–31 (5th ed. 2012) (providing an overview 
of secret ballots, poll taxes, literacy tests, and white primaries utilized by southern states to 
disenfranchise African-Americans living in the South after Reconstruction).   
 32 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311. Most of these states even adopted alternate tests 
such as grandfather clauses, property requirements, or “good character” tests to ensure that 
illiterate or poor Whites would not be deprived of the franchise. Id.  
 33 Tokaji, supra note 23, at 790.  
 34 J. Gerald Hebert, The Future of the Voting Rights Act, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 953, 953 
(2012). However, Alabama state troopers stopped those marching, began firing off rounds of 
tear gas, and beat the civil rights activists with billy clubs. Id.  
 35 Id. at 953í54. 
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in Washington, D.C., about protecting the voting rights of African-Americans 
and ending the long period of state sanctioned discrimination.36  
Following Selma, President Lyndon B. Johnson urged Congress to pass 
comprehensive legislation that would aggressively protect African-American 
voting rights.37 Acting under its enforcement powers under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress 
responded to the national outcry for racial equality by passing the Voting Rights 
Act.38 After much debate in Congress, President Johnson signed the Voting 
Rights Act into law on August 6, 1965.39  
B. Important Provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
Although the historical context of the 1960s is important for grasping why 
Congress answered President Johnson’s plea for voting rights reforms, the 
manner in which Congress responded demonstrates the innovative, yet 
controversial, mechanisms it created for ensuring racial equality at the ballot 
box. Many of these provisions raised concerns with the Act’s skeptics by 
providing federal oversight in areas traditionally reserved for state 
governments.40 
1. Section 2: Results Test 
One of the most important and uncontroversial parts of the Voting Rights 
Act is Section 2. When originally passed, Section 2 applied nationwide and 
                                                                                                                       
 36 DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 78–81 (1978).  
 37 Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
903, 912 (2008). In fact, President Johnson issued his now famous “We Shall Overcome” 
speech in which he passionately demanded that Congress pass voting rights protections for 
African-Americans in the United States. PAULEY, supra note 25, at 15. Martin Luther King, 
Jr. described Johnson’s speech as, “the most moving, eloquent, unequivocal, and passionate 
plea for human rights ever made by a president of this nation.” Id.  
 38 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ԟ1973bbԟ1 (2012)); see also Tiffany C. Graham, Rethinking Section Five: 
Deference, Direct Regulation, and Restoring Congressional Authority to Enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 667, 674 (2013).  
 39 Hebert, supra note 34, at 954. The Act was meant to prohibit the numerous practices 
used by Southern states to evade the purposes of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
by disenfranchising African-Americans. Id.  
 40 See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the 
Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 711 (2006). The Act’s strong mechanisms were 
needed to address the prevailing ability of state governments to quickly enact changes to 
voting laws that could easily evade previous attempts to reign-in discriminatory voting 
practices. See id.; see also Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 19–21 
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (providing a detailed overview of the 
Act’s most important provisions and its implications). 
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prohibited any “standard, practice, or procedure . . . imposed or applied . . . to 
deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account 
of race or color.”41 In other words, Section 2 prohibits any practice or procedure 
that has the effect of denying equal access to the political process.42 Moreover, 
Section 2 prohibits drawing electoral districts that improperly dilute minorities’ 
voting power and applies to states, counties, cities, school districts, and any 
other governmental unit that holds elections.43 Both the Department of Justice 
and private individuals may bring civil actions under Section 2 for diluting the 
voting power of minority groups.44 The Act authorizes injunctive, preventative, 
and permanent relief for Section 2 violations.45 
2. Sections 4 and 5: Preclearance and Preclearance Formula 
In contrast, the most controversial part of the Voting Rights Act is Section 
5, which is known as the preclearance requirement.46 Put simply, Section 5 
requires certain states, localities, and other “covered jurisdictions” to submit all 
proposed changes to their voting laws to the United States Attorney General or 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. District Court) 
for approval before the proposed changes go into effect.47 This Section has also 
garnered controversy for providing the Department of Justice with expansive 
discretion48 to approve or deny preclearance requests that could be based on 
partisanship rather than the merits of the proposed changes.49 
Overall, Section 5 has achieved great success in combating the 
disenfranchisement of African-Americans and other minorities across the 
                                                                                                                       
 41 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 42 See Frank R. Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: 
Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 729 (1983). 
 43 42 U.S.C § 1973 (2012). 
 44 See id. 
 45 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(d) (2012).  
 46 See Crum, supra note 18, at 1999.  
 47 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2012). Overall, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 5 
broadly and has required federal preclearance for almost all changes related to a 
jurisdiction’s voting laws. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569–70 (1969) 
(holding that when a jurisdiction makes changes relating to at-large districts, appointed 
positions, independent candidacy requirements, and write-in ballots, the jurisdiction is 
required to submit to preclearance). 
 48 See Gerken, supra note 40, at 709. This Section has been called the “most powerful 
weapon in the civil rights arsenal” because it intrudes into state and local governments’ 
traditional authority to conduct elections by forcing these governments to ask the federal 
government for permission to enact changes to their voting laws no matter how trivial the 
changes may be in order for these changes to become effective. See id. at 709–11. 
 49 See Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the Extent 
of the VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 968 
(2011).  
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United States.50 Before Section 5’s enactment, southern states could invent and 
adopt new voting mechanisms to disenfranchise African-Americans once courts 
declared current practices illegal.51 Thus, the preclearance requirement solved 
this persisting problem by “shift[ing] the burden of inertia, allowing the 
Department of Justice to get one step ahead of local officials by forbidding them 
to make any changes without its approval.”52 Enacted as a temporary provision, 
Section 5 was reauthorized by Congress for an additional five years in 197053 
and reauthorized by Congress for an additional seven years in 1975.54 In 1982, 
Congress reauthorized Section 5 for an additional twenty-five years55 and 
renewed this twenty-five year extension in 2006,56 which was set to expire in 
2031.57 
While Section 5 has generated the most debate, Section 4 bans literacy tests 
and similar prerequisites for voting and determines which states and local 
jurisdictions are subject to the Act’s preclearance requirement under Section 
5.58 This Section contains the Act’s formula for determining which jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                       
 50 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 201 
(2009). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the registration rates of African-
American voters in many Southern states have been equal or nearly equal to those of white 
voters, and the number of African-American elected officials across the South has increased 
dramatically. Id.  
 51 Gerken, supra note 40, at 711. 
 52 Id. Moreover, Section 5 shifted the burden to state governments to demonstrate the 
merits of proposed changes rather than placing the burden on the federal government or 
aggrieved parties. See Peyton McCrary et al., The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How 
the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
275, 313 (2006).  
 53 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 3, 84 Stat. 314, 
315 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2012)). 
 54 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 101, 89 Stat. 400 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2012)). 
 55 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(B)(8), 96 Stat. 
131, 133 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2012)). 
 56 For interesting pre-Shelby County commentary arguing that Section 5 is unnecessary 
because ethnic and racial minorities no longer face hurdles to ballot access in recent times at 
the level from the 1960s, see Michael J. Pitts, Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A 
Response to Samuel Issacharoff’s Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
84 NEB. L. REV. 605, 607 (2005). Specifically, Pitts argues that while Section 5 continues to 
have a major success with respect to discriminatory practices enacted by local jurisdictions, 
scholars have placed too much emphasis on Section 5’s effect on state and congressional 
elections in combating discriminatory voting laws. Id. at 610. 
 57 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ԟ1973aa (2012)) (“Significant progress has been made in 
eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority voters, including increased 
numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in 
Congress, State legislatures, and local elected offices. This progress is the direct result of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.”).  
 58 Tokaji, supra note 23, at 792.  
978 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:5 
 
are subject to preclearance. Under Section 4(b), a state or political subdivision 
must submit to preclearance if during the 1964, 1968, or 1972 presidential 
election, it maintained literacy tests or other requirements for voting and had 
voter turnout below fifty percent.59 On the other hand, Section 4(a) contains the 
bailout provisions that allow a covered jurisdiction to bail out of preclearance 
by demonstrating that it has complied with the Act’s requirements for the 
previous ten years.60  
Similar to Section 5, Congress intended for Section 4 to be temporary and 
first extended this provision for an additional five years in 1970.61 “In 1975, 
Congress reauthorized the Act for seven more years, and extended its coverage 
to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration 
or turnout as of 1972.”62 Moreover, Congress amended Section 4 to protect 
language minorities by adding a new mechanism to trigger coverage.63 The 
amendment triggered coverage of jurisdictions that provided registration and 
election materials exclusively in English by expanding the definition of “test or 
device.”64 Congress has not made any changes to Section 4’s preclearance 
formula since the 1975 amendments.65 
                                                                                                                       
 59 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2012). Specifically, the formula’s most recent language 
explained: 
On and after August 6, 1975, . . . this section . . . shall apply in any State or any political 
subdivision of a State which (i) the Attorney General determines maintained on 
November 1, 1972, any test or device, and with respect to which (ii) the Director of the 
Census determines that less than 50 per centum of the citizens of voting age were 
registered on November 1, 1972, or that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted 
in the Presidential election of November 1972. 
Id. 
 60 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a). In addition, the covered states or political subdivisions must 
demonstrate that they have taken affirmative steps to widen ballot access and include 
minority officials in election administration. Id. 
 61 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013).  
 62 Id. 
 63 Michael James Burns, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act: Getting 
the Right Answer with the Wrong Standard, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 234 (2012); see also 
LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 329–31 (providing an overview of the language 
assistance provisions of the Voting Rights Act). 
 64 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3).  
 65 Burns, supra note 63, at 234; see also Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620í21 
(explaining the Voting Rights amendment process and noting how Congress did not update 
Section 4’s coverage formula when the Act was reauthorized by Congress in 1982 and 
2006). Congress’s failure to update the coverage formula was a key factor for the justices 
who comprised the majority in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shelby County. See 
id. at 2631. 
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3. Section 3: The Pocket Trigger 
Compared to the previous sections, Section 3 has maintained a much more 
obscure role in contemporary scholarship66 and has been invoked by courts 
sparingly since the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.67 Known as the 
pocket trigger, Section 3 authorizes federal judges to submit states or other 
jurisdictions to preclearance if the court finds violations of the Fourteenth or 
Fifteenth Amendments.68 In other words, the court must first find that the 
jurisdiction engaged in intentional discrimination,69 which is a very difficult 
burden. If intentional discrimination is found, the court not only has discretion 
to submit the jurisdiction to preclearance, but also retains discretion to 
determine how long the jurisdiction will be subject to preclearance.70 Moreover, 
courts have the flexibility to tailor the preclearance requirement to specific 
types of voting laws that the jurisdiction may attempt to change or amend.71  
Overall, the preclearance language found in Section 3 is very similar to that 
found in Section 5, as both prohibit changes in a jurisdiction’s voting laws 
without first being approved by federal officials.72 Unlike Section 5’s 
preclearance language, Section 3 provides the Attorney General or a local 
federal district court with jurisdiction to hear preclearance requests—not the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.73  
Another important difference between Section 3 and Section 5 preclearance 
is what triggers preclearance under each standard. Under Section 5, a 
jurisdiction is subjected to preclearance if it has a history of discrimination as 
determined by Section 4’s formula.74 On the other hand, plaintiffs initiate 
                                                                                                                       
 66 Crum, supra note 18, at 1997. In fact, Crum’s article specifically details the lack of 
scholarship related to Section 3 by election law scholars and others. See id. at 2006ԟ15. 
 67 Id. at 2010.  
 68 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2012). 
 69 Id. While the Act’s language itself does not expressly require a finding of intentional 
discrimination, this is inferred from requiring a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendment. See id. 
 70 Id. (“[T]he court, in addition to such relief as it may grant, shall retain jurisdiction for 
such period as it may deem appropriate . . . .”).  
 71 Richard Pildes, One Easy, but Powerful, Way to Amend the VRA, ELECTION L. BLOG, 
(June 28, 2013, 6:53 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=52349, archived at http://perma.cc 
/BJ3A-KQFX. Hence, if the court finds that the jurisdiction only has a problem with voter 
identification laws, then the jurisdiction may only be required to pre-clear changes to its 
voter identification laws rather than having to submit all changes to its voting laws as 
required under Section 5. Id. 
 72 See Crum, supra note 18, at 2008.  
 73 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (“[T]he court . . . shall retain jurisdiction . . . unless and 
until . . . [t]he court finds that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or 
procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 74 Crum, supra note 18, at 2009. 
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Section 3 preclearance by filing a suit under Section 2 or another section of the 
Act.75  
However, the court must find that the jurisdiction violated the Fourteenth or 
Fifteenth Amendment by engaging in intentional discrimination in order for a 
jurisdiction to be subject to preclearance under Section 3.76 Although this 
standard is high, two states—Arkansas77 and New Mexico78—six counties,79 
and one city80 have been bailed in to preclearance under Section 3.81 Nearly all 
of these Section 3 cases have occurred in the context of discriminatory 
redistricting claims.82 An additional difference between Section 5 preclearance 
and Section 3 preclearance is the fact that Congress intended for Section 3’s 
preclearance regime to be permanent. Thus, Section 3 would not become 
subject to periodic constitutional scrutiny similar to when Congress was forced 
to reauthorize Section 5’s temporary provisions.83 
                                                                                                                       
 75 This is the approach the Obama Administration has chosen to pursue against states 
with restrictive voter identification laws following the Shelby County decision. See, e.g., 
Complaint, United States v. North Carolina, supra note 7; Complaint, United States v. 
Texas, supra note 7.   
 76 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). Unlike Section 2’s lower standard that includes 
discriminatory results as amended by Congress in 1982, Section 3 demands a much higher 
burden of proof by requiring the plaintiff to prove the jurisdiction intentionally denied or 
abridged a citizen’s right to vote on account of race. See id. 
 77 See Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 601–02 (E.D. Ark. 1990). 
 78 See Crum, supra note 18, at 2007 n.88 (citing Sanchez v. Anaya, No. 82-0067M, slip 
op. at 8 (D.N.M. Dec. 17, 1984) (consent decree)).  
 79 See id. at 2010 n.102 (citing Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., Nos. CV88-5143 KN, CV88-
5435 KN, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1991) (Los Angeles County, California); 
McMillan v. Escambia Cnty., No. 77-0432, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1979) (Escambia 
County, Florida); United States v. Thurston Cnty., No. 78-0-380, slip op. at 3 (D. Neb. May 
9, 1979) (Thurston County, Nebraska); United States v. Bernalillo Cnty., No. CV-98-156, 
slip op. at 11 (D.N.M. Apr. 22, 1998) (Bernalillo County, New Mexico); Kirkie v. Buffalo 
Cnty., No. 03-CV-3011, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30960, at *7 (D.S.D. Feb. 12, 2004) 
(Buffalo County, South Dakota); Blackmoon v. Charles Mix Cnty., No. Civ. 05-4017, slip 
op. at 2 (D.S.D. Dec. 4, 2007) (Charles Mix County, South Dakota)). 
 80 See id. at 2010 n.103 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. C-1-87-388, slip op. at 
20 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 11, 1990) (City of Chattanooga, Tennessee)).  
 81 Crum, supra note 18, at 2010. Most of the jurisdictions submitted to preclearance 
under Section 3 have been required to pre-clear voting changes because the jurisdiction 
voluntarily submitted to Section 3 under a consent decree agreement. See id. at 2015. 
Overall, when a jurisdiction agrees to a consent decree, the jurisdiction admits that it 
engaged in unconstitutional conduct, which saves the parties from having to prove 
intentional discrimination under Section 3. Id. Besides the high burden of proof, intentional 
discrimination disputes are often costly to the parties involved and avoiding these disputes 
allows the Department of Justice to focus on other cases. See id. Of the jurisdictions 
submitted to Section 3 preclearance, only Arkansas and Escambia County, Florida have been 
covered involuntarily by disputing intentional discrimination claims alleged by plaintiffs. Id. 
 82 See Rapoport, supra note 19. 
 83 See Crum, supra note 18, at 2009. Aside from these major provisions, Sections 6 
through 8 of the Act provide for the assignment of federal examiners and observers to 
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III. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AS INTERPRETED BY FEDERAL COURTS 
Generally, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted congressional 
authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment by applying the rational means 
standard.84 Accordingly, the Court has upheld the Voting Rights Act and its key 
provisions on numerous occasions in which plaintiffs brought direct 
constitutional challenges against the Act.85 Moreover, these challenges created 
many opportunities for the Court to provide its commentary on the Act’s 
viability and its effect on race relations in the United States.86  
A. Direct Constitutional Challenges to the Voting Rights Act 
In 1966, South Carolina challenged the Voting Rights Act by asking the 
Supreme Court to enjoin the United States Attorney General from submitting 
the state to preclearance.87 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court 
addressed whether Congress exceeded its enforcement authority under the 
Fifteenth Amendment by enacting Section 5’s preclearance requirement.88 
While the Court recognized its precedent that affirmed state power to administer 
voting, the Court explained that the Fifteenth Amendment’s protection of 
minority voting rights superseded exertions of state power.89 The Court 
explained that despite powers reserved for the states, “Congress may use any 
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial 
discrimination in voting.”90 Thus, the Court upheld the Act as a valid exercise 
of Congress’s power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment by applying a 
deferential standard toward Congress’s enforcement powers under this 
Amendment.91 Even after Congress reauthorized the Act in 1970, the Court 
                                                                                                                       
jurisdictions covered under preclearance or where otherwise needed to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment. At the time of the Act’s enactment, the Supreme Court did not yet declare the 
poll tax unconstitutional and thus Section 10 granted the Attorney General the authority to 
file suits against states that still utilized this discriminatory practice. Tokaji, supra note 23, at 
792. 
 84 Burns, supra note 63, at 237 (explaining how the Court’s application of the rational 
means standard has resulted in a broad interpretation of Congress’s authority to enforce the 
guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment by appropriate legislation and thus has led to the 
Court upholding the VRA and the targeted provisions on multiple occasions). 
 85 See infra Part III.A.  
 86 See infra Part III.B. For a more general background on how the Supreme Court and 
lower federal courts have interpreted and applied Section 5, see LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra 
note 31, at 171–201.  
 87 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966).  
 88 Id. at 323–24.  
 89 Id. at 325–26.  
 90 Id. at 324.  
 91 Id. at 328. In terms of whether the Act’s coverage formula was a rational means of 
preventing discrimination, the Court found that the formula and the specific evidence that 
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continued to defer to Congress’s power to enact the Voting Rights Act under the 
Fifteenth Amendment.92  
When Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1975, the Court again 
upheld Section 5 under a rational means standard.93 In City of Rome v. United 
States, the Court expanded its analysis from Katzenbach by stating that 
Congress could use its authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment 
by prohibiting voting practices with a discriminatory purpose or effect.94 In the 
Court’s view, Congress’s authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment 
was similar to its expansive powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.95  
After Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act in 2006, a Texas utility 
district with an elected board brought an action claiming that it was entitled to a 
bailout under the Act.96 Alternatively, the district argued that Section 5 was 
unconstitutional.97 In Northwest Austin v. Mukasey, the Texas utility district 
was subject to preclearance because the state itself was subject to Section 5 
preclearance.98 The district court found that the Texas utility district was 
ineligible for a bailout because it failed to meet the requirements of a “political 
subdivision” but affirmed the Act’s constitutionality under Katzenbach.99 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed. Based on statutory interpretation, the 
                                                                                                                       
jurisdictions were enacting new maneuvers to avoid enforcement provided Congress with 
sufficient evidence to enact Section 5’s preclearance requirements. See id. at 330. 
 92 In Georgia v. United States, the Attorney General objected to Georgia’s 
reapportionment plan for the state legislature and succeeded in prohibiting the State from 
implementing the plan. 411 U.S. 526, 535, 541 (1973). On appeal, Georgia argued that 
Section 5 preclearance did not apply to the reapportionment changes and that even if it did, 
the Act’s preclearance requirement was unconstitutional. Id. at 531. The Court found that 
preclearance did apply and dismissed the constitutional challenge by deferring to the 
Katzenbach decision and reaffirming Congress’s power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 535. 
 93 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176í77 (1980); Burns, supra note 
63, at 239.  
 94 City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 175. Remember that the original language of Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act prohibited those practices with a discriminatory purpose. The Act did 
not include a results test until Congress amended the Act in 1982. See supra note 76. 
 95 City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 175. Again in 1999, the Court deferred to Congress’s 
power under the enforcement provision of the Fifteenth Amendment by holding that 
Monterey County, California was required to seek preclearance under Section 5 before 
implementing changes to electing county judges. See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 
266, 282–84 (1999). Although state law required these changes to judicial elections, the 
Court still dismissed the county’s constitutional challenge by simply deferring to 
Katzenbach and City of Rome. See id. at 283–84. 
 96 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 197 
(2009). 
 97 Id. at 197. 
 98 Burns, supra note 63, at 240; see also LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 200–01 
(summarizing reactions to the NAMUDNO decision from election law commentators with 
differing viewpoints on the Court’s important analysis and decision).  
 99 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 233–34, 
268 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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Court viewed the utility district as a “political subdivision” under the Act and 
thus the district qualified for a petition to bail out of the Act’s preclearance 
requirement.100 Utilizing the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the Court did 
not reach the merits of the constitutional claims against Section 5 because the 
Court resolved the decision on statutory grounds.101 
While the Court avoided the constitutional question altogether in Northwest 
Austin, the continued constitutionality of Section 5 remained uncertain.102 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court articulated its concerns over deviating from 
important principles of federalism that risked Section 5’s continued vitality.103 
B. Other Important Decisions: Boerne and Shaw 
Aside from the Court’s skepticism over the continued viability of Section 5 
in Northwest Austin, an earlier decision signaled Section 5’s constitutional 
infirmities. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court limited Congress’s 
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment against the states.104 
Asserting its supremacy in interpreting the scope of Congress’s enforcement 
powers—rather than Congress itself—the Court declared that “[t]here must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied 
and the means adopted to that end.”105 
Compared to Katzenbach’s deferential approach to congressional 
enforcement of the Reconstruction amendments, the Court in Boerne took a 
stance that heavily favored state sovereignty against federal intervention.106 In 
many cases that followed, the Court struck down federal legislation that 
                                                                                                                       
 100 NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 211.  
 101 Id. at 204–06.  
 102 Id. at 210–11. The eight-justice majority explained:  
More than 40 years ago, this Court concluded that exceptional conditions prevailing 
in certain parts of the country justified extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to 
our federal system. In part due to the success of that legislation, we are now a very 
different Nation. Whether conditions continue to justify such legislation is a difficult 
constitutional question we do not answer today. 
Id. at 211 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 103 See id. at 202í03. 
 104 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).  
 105 Id. at 520. In other words, Congress does not possess the authority to engage in 
independent constitutional interpretation and that its enforcement powers are “limited to 
remedying violations of constitutional rights as defined by the Court.” Ellen D. Katz, 
Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2362í63 (2003); 
see Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis 
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 479 (1999); 
Michael Paisner, Note, Boerne Supremacy: Congressional Responses to City of Boerne v. 
Flores and the Scope of Congress’s Article I Powers, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 541 (2005). 
 106 See Katz, supra note 105, at 2362í63. 
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intervened in the realm of state sovereignty when failing the congruence and 
proportionality test.107 Thus, Boerne greatly circumscribed Congress’s 
enforcement powers.108 However, Boerne did not spell the imminent demise of 
Section 5 because the decision occurred in the context of laws passed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment—not the Fifteenth Amendment. In the cases that 
followed, the Court found that the Voting Rights Act served as a model of 
“congruent and proportional” legislation.109  
In another line of voting rights cases, the Court expressed skepticism over 
the continued viability of the Voting Rights Act because of fears that this 
legislation impermissibly injected race into American politics.110 In Shaw v. 
Reno, plaintiffs challenged North Carolina’s redistricting plan as 
“unconstitutional racial gerrymander.”111 The Court expressed concerns that the 
Voting Rights Act could potentially dissolve into a system of “racial spoils” and 
worried that the Act’s protection of voting rights based on race could “entrench 
rather than undermine racial divisions” across the United States.112  
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Voting 
Rights Act in numerous challenges brought after the Act’s reauthorization, 
                                                                                                                       
 107 See id. at 2361ԟ62. 
 108 See id. at 2362ԟ63. However, the Court has confirmed that Congress still maintains 
the power “to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory in 
effect, if not in intent . . . .” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004). 
 109 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001). Although the 
Supreme Court dodged the constitutional challenge in NAMUDNO, the Boerne decision 
played an interesting role in the District Court’s analysis. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. 
No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 241 (D.D.C. 2008). In examining the 
constitutional challenge to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in Northwest Austin v. 
Mukasey, the District Court held that Katzenbach rather than Boerne was the appropriate 
standard in the case. Id. The District Court judge explained that none of the Boerne line of 
cases dealt with statutes involving voting rights or racial discrimination. See id. at 242. 
Further, the court explained that these cases never declared that Katzenbach and City of 
Rome no longer govern challenges to statutes aimed at ending racial discrimination in 
voting. Id. In addition, the court explained that the Supreme Court had never applied the 
congruence and proportionality test outside the Fourteenth Amendment context. Id. at 243. 
The District Court upheld Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under the Katzenbach standard 
and also upheld this Section as congruent and proportional under the Boerne line of cases. 
See id. at 278–79. 
 110 See Crum, supra note 18, at 2003; see also LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 31, at 
245–48 (providing a summary of the reactions to the Shaw decision from both critics and 
supporters).  
 111 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633í34 (1993).  
 112 Crum, supra note 18, at 2002 (quoting Gerken, supra note 40, at 745). This 
important case can be viewed as a foreshadowing of the Court’s dismantling of Sections 4 
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act in hopes of “bring[ing] us closer to the world of normal 
politics.” Gerken, supra note 40, at 745; see Steven A. Light, Too (Color)blind to See: The 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Rehnquist Court, 8 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 50 
(1998); Justin Schwartz, Comment, A Not Quite Color-Blind Constitution: Racial 
Discrimination and Racial Preference in Justice O’Connor’s “Newest” Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1099 (1997).  
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Congress’s failure to update Section 4’s coverage formula in 1982 and 2006 
raised concerns for the Court in considering whether the Act’s deviation from 
key principles of federalism was still warranted.113 
IV. HURRICANE SHELBY 
Rarely does the Supreme Court of the United States issue a decision that 
amounts to a “political hurricane” in the context of voting rights. But Shelby 
County was just that—freeing jurisdictions formerly subject to the burdens of 
preclearance.114 Texas and North Carolina have moved forward in a post-Shelby 
County world by enacting strict voter identification laws that many argue will 
burden minority voting strength and prevent voters such as Alberta Currie from 
exercising their right to vote.115 Aside from these immediate consequences, the 
Court’s decision spurred intense debate among election law scholars, some of 
whom believed the Court acted rationally because Section 4 relied on data that 
was half a century old.116 In contrast, many sharply criticized the Court’s 
decision117 or argued that Section 5 is still desperately needed.118Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                       
 113 Congress’s failure to update the Act’s coverage formula in 2006 also raised concern 
that the reauthorization process had become too “backward looking” rather than focusing on 
new problems emerging in the struggle for racial equality at the ballot box. See DAVID L. 
EPSTEIN, ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 223 (2006). Furthermore, 
election law commentators engaged in intense debate during the Act’s 2006 reauthorization 
process over whether the Supreme Court would continue to uphold the Act’s validity. See 
Heather K. Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1213, 1230ԟ35 
(2007).  
 114 Doug Chapin, Voting Rights After Shelby County: Bring On the Election Geeks, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 327, 327ԟ28 (2013) (explaining how states formerly blocked from enacting 
changes to voting laws can move forward with changes to voting laws and calling on 
election law “geeks” to compile data to update Section 4’s coverage formula). 
 115 See Richard L. Hasen, Supreme Error, SLATE (Aug. 19, 2013, 12:08 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/north_carolina_s_sp
eedy_vote_suppression_tactics_show_exactly_why_the_voting.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/CZU5-4ZHN.  
 116 See Mark Rush, Shelby County v. Holder: A Case of Judicial Hubris or a Clash of 
Ancient Principles?, 12 ELECTION L.J. 322, 322 (2013); William S. Consovoy & Thomas R. 
McCarthy, Shelby County v. Holder: The Restoration of Constitutional Order, CATO SUP. 
CT. REV., 2012ԟ2013, at 31í32; Abigail Thernstrom, A Vindication of the Voting Rights Act, 
WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2013, 7:28 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10 
001424127887323873904578569453308090298, archived at http://perma.cc/SDH4-UMHV.  
 117 See Daniel P. Tokaji & Paul Gronke, The Party Line: Shelby County and Beyond, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 241, 241 (2013). The authors described the Court’s decision as “the end of an 
era in which barriers to racial minorities’ participation and representation were substantially 
weakened, if not entirely shattered.” Id. 
 118 See David Schultz, William Faulkner and the Dilemmas of Shelby County, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 341, 342 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he political changes that the VRA sought 
to secure will not be permanent until the South wants them to be permanent” and that 
“lacking this change in the South, the VRA is still needed, even though it may never be able 
to effect the cultural changes required to render the law unnecessary”); see also Heather 
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before proposing statutory changes to the Act, it is worth examining the 
principles articulated by the Court in Shelby County and the important 
implications that have already materialized in wake of this decision. 
A. Shelby County v. Holder: A Brief Background 
In 2010, Shelby County, Alabama, a covered jurisdiction under the Voting 
Rights Act, sued the United States Attorney General in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that 
Sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional and a 
permanent injunction against the enforcement of these sections.119  
Shelby County argued that Section 4’s coverage formula was no longer 
“relevant” in 2006 because it relied on data from 1972.120 Moreover, Shelby 
County argued that the statutory coverage factors were tied to a citizen’s ability 
to cast a ballot, whereas Section 5 in contemporary times had been linked to 
“second generation barriers to voting” rather than state interference with ballot 
access.121 Ruling against Shelby County, the district court explained that 
Congress found sufficient evidence in the Act’s 2006 reauthorization that voting 
discrimination had continued in covered jurisdictions, which warranted Section 
5’s protections.122 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit affirmed the district court decision after carefully analyzing six 
categories of evidence related to the administration of preclearance under 
Section 5.123 After analyzing this information, the appellate court accepted 
Congress’s conclusion that Section 2 litigation remained generally ineffective to 
protect minority voters; thus Section 5 was still necessary.124  
                                                                                                                       
Gerken, Goodbye to the Crown Jewel of the Civil Rights Movement, SLATE (June 25, 2013, 
3:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/06/supreme_ 
court_and_the_voting_rights_act_goodbye_to_section_5.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
TYP7-E7PH.  
 119 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013). 
 120 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 505 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 508. Thus, the court found that “Section 4(b)’s disparate geographic coverage 
remains ‘sufficiently related’ to the problem it targets” and is constitutionally valid. Id. at 
507. 
 123 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 862–63 (D.C. Cir. 2012). This evidence 
included (1) Attorney General objections to voting changes; (2) Attorney General requests 
for more information regarding voting changes; (3) successful Section 2 challenges in 
jurisdictions subject to preclearance; (4) the dispatching of federal observers to monitor 
elections in covered jurisdictions; (5) Section 5 preclearance suits involving covered 
jurisdictions; and (6) the overall deterrent effect of Section 5. Id.  
 124 Id. at 873.  
2014] FINDING LIFE IN HURRICANE SHELBY 987 
 
B. Principles Guiding the Supreme Court in Shelby County 
In explaining the Court’s 54 decision striking down Section 4’s formula, 
Chief Justice Roberts began with the fundamental principle that a statute that 
departs from equal sovereignty between the states by placing a disparate impact 
on geographic regions must be sufficiently related to the problem the statute 
targets.125 Roberts explained that states have historically been given wide 
latitude to regulate elections and draw congressional districts even though the 
federal government retains significant control over federal elections.126 
Moreover, the Court continued to emphasize that states enjoy equal sovereignty 
among each other and that this principle is especially important when legislation 
imposes disparate treatment of states.127 
Highlighting how the Voting Rights Act sharply deviated from these 
principles,128 the Court explained that the Act’s mechanisms were necessary in 
the immediate aftermath of intense racial discrimination because of the 
inadequacy of protecting voting rights through case-by-case litigation.129 The 
Court stressed that the departure from these principles was due in part to the 
Act’s temporary nature as it was originally set to expire after five years.130 In 
terms of the Act’s coverage formula, the Court explained that the formula made 
sense at the time of the Act’s passage because Congress limited its attention to 
                                                                                                                       
 125 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 (2013).  
 126 Id. at 2623. 
 127 Id.  
 128 First, the Court explained that the coverage formula differentiated between the states 
and thus deviated from the longstanding principle that states enjoy equal sovereignty. Id. 
The Court explained that differentiation between the states required a showing that the 
statute’s disparate impact on geographic regions is “sufficiently related to the problem that it 
targets.” Id. at 2627. Because the Act’s coverage formula was based on data from 1972, the 
Court worried that the problems targeted by Section 5 may be based on outdated criteria. See 
id. at 2626. Second, the Court criticized the blanket approach taken by the Act in requiring 
all changes to a jurisdiction’s voting laws—no matter how big or small—be subjected to 
preclearance before approval. See id. at 2631. Finally, the Court expressed concern about the 
adequacy of the congressional findings on voting discrimination and when the Act would 
expire. See id. at 2624ԟ25. 
 129 Id. at 2624 (“Case-by-case litigation had proved inadequate to prevent such racial 
discrimination in voting, in part because States merely switched to discriminatory devices 
not covered by the federal decrees, enacted difficult new tests, or simply defied and evaded 
court orders.” (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))).  
 130 See id. at 2625. Chief Justice Roberts placed a strong emphasis on how Congress 
intended the Act’s strong mechanisms to be temporary. The Chief Justice explained, “[t]his 
was strong medicine, but Congress determined it was needed to address entrenched racial 
discrimination in voting, an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in 
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the 
Constitution . . . reflecting the unprecedented nature of these measures, they were scheduled 
to expire after five years.” Id. at 2618 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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geographic areas where participation fell far below the national average, thus 
indicating jurisdictions that had used devices to prevent racial minorities from 
exercising their right to vote.131 
As the Court continued its analysis, one theme emerged in the majority’s 
opinion: change. While the Voting Rights Act departed from fundamental 
principles of federalism, the Court stressed that conditions have changed 
dramatically since the Act’s original enactment over fifty years ago.132 While 
the Court acknowledged that these changes have certainly occurred because of 
the Voting Rights Act, it found the lack of corresponding adjustments in Section 
5’s restrictions and unchanged scope of Section 4(b)’s coverage formula as 
problematic considering these developments.133 The Court cited its precedent 
that warned Congress against any further expansion of Section 5 that could 
jeopardize its continued constitutionality, and thus emphasized that the 
broadening of this provision was very problematic.134 However, the Court saved 
Section 5 from constitutional infirmity by turning its focus to Section 4’s 
preclearance formula. 
Comparing conditions from 1966 when the Court analyzed the Act’s 
constitutionality in Katzenbach, and the dramatic changes since that decision in 
Northwest Austin in 2009, the Court stated: “a statute’s current burdens must be 
justified by current needs, and any disparate geographic coverage must be 
‘sufficiently related to the problem that it targets. The coverage formula met 
that test in 1965, but no longer does so.”135 The Court further emphasized the 
change that had occurred since Congress originally devised the coverage 
formula in 1965 by explaining that at the time of the Act’s enactment there were 
                                                                                                                       
 131 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618ԟ19. 
 132 Indeed, the majority cited evidence that registration and voting rates between 
African-Americans and whites in covered jurisdictions now reach parity and that blatant 
evasions of federal decrees banning discriminatory voting practices are now rare. See id. at 
2625. 
 133 See id. In fact, the majority argues that the Act’s mechanisms have grown stronger 
over time such as the extension of time to twenty-five years rather than the original five-year 
extension. Moreover, the Court cited the fact that Congress expanded Section 5’s 
prohibitions in 2006 to include any voting law “that has the purpose of or will have the 
effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States,’ on account of race, 
color, or language minority status, to elect their preferred candidates of choice.” Id. at 2627 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134 See id. The Court’s decision in Northwest Austin continued to command an important 
role in its decision in Shelby County. The majority sharply criticized Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion for minimizing the Court’s equal state sovereignty analysis in Northwest 
Austin. See id. at 2630 (“[T]he dissent analyzes the question presented as if our decision in 
Northwest Austin never happened. For example, the dissent refuses to consider the principle 
of equal sovereignty, despite Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its significance.”). 
 135 Id. at 2627 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
2014] FINDING LIFE IN HURRICANE SHELBY 989 
 
two groups of jurisdictions: those with a recent history of using discriminatory 
devices and those without such a history.136  
Although the government argued that Congress correctly extended the Act 
in 2006 based on a multitude of data indicating the Act’s continued necessity, 
the Court responded by stating, “Congress did not use the record it compiled to 
shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a 
formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present 
day.”137 The majority concluded by explaining how congressional data shows 
that the current problems facing minorities are barriers to voting such as vote 
dilution rather than ballot access, but that the Act’s coverage formula still 
remains premised on targeting jurisdictions based on ballot access.138 Thus, in 
the Court’s view, the coverage formula had reached its point of demise. 
C. Developments Following Shelby County—A New Battle Begins 
After Chief Justice Roberts’s announced the Court’s decision and a media 
frenzy condemning the decision erupted,139 it did not take long for states 
formerly subject to preclearance to capitalize on their new found freedom by 
moving ahead with changes to their voting laws. In Texas, state authorities 
announced their intention to move ahead with implementing Texas Senate Bill 
14, which was passed and signed into law in 2011, but blocked under 
preclearance by the Department of Justice.140  
The Texas law requires nearly all in-person voters to present one of the 
following forms of government-issued photo identification in order to vote: (1) 
a driver’s license, personal ID card, or election identification certificate (EIC); 
(2) a license to carry a concealed handgun; (3) a U.S. military ID card; (4) a 
U.S. citizenship certificate with photograph; or (5) a U.S. passport.141 For 
individuals who do not possess any of these forms of identification, the law 
allows Texans to apply for an election identification certificate at a Department 
                                                                                                                       
 136 Id. at 2628. Notably, the Court stressed that this distinction today between states no 
longer remains, but the Act wrongly treats states as if the distinction continues. Id. 
 137 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629.  
 138 Id. at 2629í31 (“Viewing the preclearance requirements as targeting such efforts 
simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on the § 4 coverage formula, which 
is based on voting tests and access to the ballot, not vote dilution. We cannot pretend that we 
are reviewing an updated statute, or try our hand at updating the statute ourselves, based on 
the new record compiled by Congress.”). 
 139 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 118.  
 140 See Scott Neuman, Justice Files Voter Discrimination Suit Against Texas, NPR 
(Aug. 22, 2013, 6:14 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/08/22/214589 
956/justice-files-voter-discrimination-suit-against-texas, archived at http://perma.cc/YS2P-
VWPJ.  
 141 TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 63.0101 (West 2012).  
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of Public Safety license bureau142—which may force some individuals to travel 
up to 200 miles round trip in order to obtain this identification card.143  
In August 2013, the Department of Justice filed suit against Texas under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and asked the court to submit Texas to 
preclearance under Section 3.144 The suit alleged that the Republican-controlled 
legislature passed the voter identification law to intentionally discriminate 
against the state’s growing Hispanic and African-American populations.145 The 
suit also cited Texas’s long history of racial and ethnic discrimination in voting 
rights and the strong anti-immigrant rhetoric surrounding the passage of this 
voter identification law as evidence that Texas intentionally discriminated 
against minorities.146  
In September 2013, the Department of Justice followed its course of action 
against Texas by filing suit against the State of North Carolina for a similarly 
controversial voter identification law signed into law after Shelby County.147 
The governor signed the bill into law despite massive protests led by civil rights 
demonstrators and minority-allied groups.148 Although the entire State of North 
                                                                                                                       
 142 TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521A.001 (West 2012).  
 143 See Complaint, United States v. Texas, supra note 7, at 4. Moreover, in order to 
obtain an election identification certificate, the individual must possess an expired driver’s 
license or personal identification card, an original copy of their birth certificate, or U.S. 
citizenship or naturalization papers. TRANSP. § 521A.001. 
 144 See Complaint, United States v. Texas, supra note 7, at 14. 
 145 Id. at 5–6.  
 146 Id. Furthermore, the Department of Justice’s Complaint notes how African-
Americans and Hispanics disproportionately lack the types of identification required by the 
law compared to whites, which is likely to cause substantial burdens for these groups in 
exercising their rights to vote. Id. Overall, the Department of Justice claims these factors 
along with the law’s strict requirements will cause the law to have a discriminatory result, 
which violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See id. at 14. Moreover, the Department 
of Justice’s complaint argues that the law will result in Hispanic and African-American 
voters having still less opportunity than other members of the Texas electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. Id. at 5. Accordingly, the 
Department of Justice has requested the Texas District Court to submit the State to 
preclearance under Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act and to prevent enforcement of the 
new voter identification law. See id. at 14. 
 147 Charlie Savage, Justice Department Poised to File Lawsuit over Voter ID Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/us/politics/justice-department-
poised-to-file-lawsuit-over-voter-id-law-in-north-carolina.html, archived at http://perma.cc 
/Q9ZR-99RM. To be clear, voter identification laws are not constitutionally suspect. In fact, 
the Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s voter identification law in 2008. See Crawford v. 
Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008). The Court found that Indiana’s 
interests supporting its statute requiring government-issued photo identification to vote as 
sufficient to justify equal protection standards. Id. at 200. These valid state interests 
included: deterring and detecting voter fraud, participating in a nationwide effort to improve 
and modernize election procedures, and safeguarding voter confidence. See id. at 192ԟ97. 
 148 See Penda D. Hair, The Top 5 Voting Rights Moments of 2013, HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/penda-d-hair/voting-rights-2013_b_4498474.html/ (last 
updated Feb. 24, 2014, 5:59 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/WE4L-T5HK.  
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Carolina was not formerly subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Act, 
forty-one of the state’s one hundred counties were formerly subject to Section 5 
and North Carolina endured a long history of racial discrimination.149 The new 
voting law reduced the number of early voting days available to voters, 
eliminated same-day voter registration during the early voting period, and 
prohibited the counting of provisional ballots cast by voters who attempt to vote 
in their county, but outside their home precinct.150  
Importantly, the new law imposed strict photo identification requirements 
for those wishing to vote in-person in the State of North Carolina. The law 
requires voters to present a valid driver’s license or non-operator photo 
identification, a U.S. passport, U.S. military card or veteran’s card, or a driver’s 
license issued by another state.151 Hence, the Department of Justice complaint 
argues that the North Carolina legislature was motivated by a discriminatory 
intent in passing this law with knowledge that it would impair and thus suppress 
minority turnout after high levels of African-American participation in the 2008 
and 2012 presidential elections.152 The Department of Justice argued that the 
new law violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and asked the court to bail 
in North Carolina under Section 3(c) of the Act for engaging in intentional 
discrimination.153 The complaint warns that in the absence of preclearance 
under Section 3, North Carolina will continue to violate the Voting Rights Act 
and the guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.154  
While these new legal disputes are not likely to be resolved soon, they 
reveal the steps the Department of Justice is willing to take to use federal 
measures to prevent states from enacting voting laws that impose selective 
criteria on how voters can exercise this critical right. In the aftermath of Shelby 
County, federal courts must now grapple with the Court’s decision and the 
Department of Justice’s request to use the Act’s other sections to prevent voter 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or language.  
V. WINNING THE NEW VOTING RIGHTS WAR: REFORMING SECTION 3 
PRECLEARANCE 
As the latest legal battles between the Department of Justice and states with 
restrictive voting laws unfold, the remaining sections of the Voting Rights Act 
will be tested. Many election law scholars believe that without Section 5 
                                                                                                                       
 149 Complaint, United States v. North Carolina, supra note 7, at 5. 
 150 Id. at 6. However, the new law does not allow voters to use student IDs, public-
employee IDs, or photo IDs issued by public assistance agencies—most of which are more 
common and easy to acquire. See id. at 13í15.  
 151 Id. at 13í15. 
 152 Id. at 26.  
 153 See id. at 28.  
 154 Id.  
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preclearance, the Act is effectively dead,155 while others believe that the 
remaining sections may provide some hope for protecting voting rights.156 
Accordingly, Congress should update Section 3’s preclearance mechanism by 
lowering its standard of proof for submitting jurisdictions and by amending 
Section 3 to clarify its scope. Moreover, Congress should amend Section 3 to 
equalize the burdens between parties by requiring jurisdictions to initially prove 
that it enacted the challenged voting law for non-discriminatory purposes. 
While the Department of Justice’s current Section 2 claims against Texas and 
North Carolina may have merit, the likelihood of success is dim given the lack 
of proof in showing intentional racial discrimination under Section 3’s current 
bail-in remedy. Without reform, Alberta Currie and other voters may never be 
able to vote again. 
A. Reforming Section 3’s Burden of Proof is the Proper Solution 
Although the Department of Justice has already invoked Section 3 
preclearance as the appropriate remedy in its suits against Texas and North 
Carolina, Section 3’s potential benefits may never be realized because Section 3 
demands proof of intentional discrimination.157 Further, the contours of Section 
3’s scope remain unclear. For these reasons, Congress needs to amend Section 3 
in numerous ways to lower the standard of proof for subjecting jurisdictions to 
preclearance and to prevent jurisdictions from enacting discriminatory laws 
under the guise of preventing voter fraud or preserving political incumbency. 
First, Congress should revise Section 3’s language to provide federal judges 
with discretion to submit jurisdictions to preclearance if plaintiffs can 
demonstrate that the jurisdiction’s law results in discrimination.158 The addition 
of this “results test” would have a powerful impact on plaintiffs’ ability to bring 
claims against discriminatory voting laws by expanding the Act’s coverage to 
plaintiffs that are harmed “as a result” of a jurisdiction’s voting laws. Moreover, 
this amendment would create incentives for private plaintiffs to hold state and 
local jurisdictions accountable for their voting laws in the absence of federal 
                                                                                                                       
 155 See J. Christian Adams, Supreme Court Buries Section 5 of Voting Rights Act, PJ 
MEDIA (June 25, 2013, 9:04 AM), http://pjmedia.com/jchristianadams/2013/06/25/supreme-
court-buries-section-5-of-voting-rights-act/, archived at http://perma.cc/H3Q8-D6ML; 
Robert Joyce, Voting Rights Act Preclearance Is Dead: Practical Considerations, COATES’ 
CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (July 2, 2013), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=7193, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5XZ6-9KJZ; Steven Seidenberg, With the Supreme Court’s OK, States Begin 
Imposing New Laws to Limit the Vote, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2014, 11:19 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/with_the_supreme_courts_ok_states_begin_im
posing_new_laws_to_limit_the_vote/, archived at http://perma.cc/P25N-444U.  
 156 See Hasen, supra note 115.  
 157 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012). 
 158 This new revision mirrors Section 2’s language by submitting a jurisdiction to 
Section 3 preclearance if the plaintiff can show that the mechanism “results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color.” See infra Appendix. 
2014] FINDING LIFE IN HURRICANE SHELBY 993 
 
supervision under Section 5 preclearance. While others may not readily support 
this approach,159 the current standard that requires plaintiffs to demonstrate 
intentional discrimination is too burdensome in the absence of federal 
monitoring formerly provided by Section 5’s unique preclearance regime. 
Furthermore, lowering this burden of proof would allow judges to submit more 
jurisdictions with discriminatory voting laws to Section 3 preclearance in cases 
where plaintiffs lack access to evidence of intentional discrimination. Although 
powerful, this revision would be relatively easy to make160 and would provide 
the Department of Justice with a more potent weapon against states like Texas 
and North Carolina where voting will inevitably become more difficult for 
segments of the population, but where evidence of intentional discrimination by 
these jurisdictions is scarce.161 
While critics of this approach may argue that expanding Section 3 
preclearance to include a results test could render Section 3 constitutionally 
suspect on interfering with state sovereignty,162 such worries were likely 
alleviated by Shelby County because the Court did not strike down Section 5 as 
unconstitutional. By striking down Section 4’s coverage formula as being 
outdated rather than striking down Section 5 preclearance itself, the Court in 
Shelby County implicitly signaled that preclearance was acceptable so long as 
the method of selecting which geographic jurisdictions were subject to this 
mechanism reflected current problems facing the nation rather than historical 
conditions. Thus, amending Section 3’s preclearance standard of proof would 
escape constitutional suspicion under Shelby County so long as federal judges 
retain discretion to submit only those jurisdictions with recent problems of 
discriminatory voting laws and the requirements contain targeted preclearance 
and sunset dates.163 
                                                                                                                       
 159 See Crum, supra note 18, at 2037. Crum is wary of a results type amendment to 
Section 3. But he relies more on the Court’s political ideology itself rather than focusing on 
how the Court decided Boerne within the context of Congress’s enforcement powers under 
Fourteenth Amendment and rather than on how Katzenbach’s more deferential standard 
remains valid and applicable to the Voting Rights Act and other laws passed under the 
Fifteenth Amendment, despite the Court’s decision in NAMUDNO. See id. 
 160 Pildes, supra note 71. Pildes makes a similar recommendation for amending the Act, 
but this Note has not called for Section 3 to be amended to “include violations of the Voting 
Rights Act itself.” Id. Pildes argues “Congress could also include significant violations of 
the other federal statutes to protect the right to vote that have been enacted since 1965, 
including the Motor Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act.” Id. Although 
these suggestions are similarly novel and are worth further investigation, this Note proposes 
amendments to Section 3 that lower the standard of proof based on Section 2’s “results” 
language discussed supra. See infra Appendix. 
 161 For a discussion on how this change could be implemented into the current version 
of Section 3, see infra Appendix. 
 162 See supra note 159.   
 163 For an examination of the main constitutional counterargument to this point, see 
infra Part V.B. 
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Another important reform that Congress should make to Section 3 is 
triggering this section’s preclearance mechanism if federal courts find repeated 
violations of significant, ongoing voting discrimination rather than just single 
constitutional violations or a history of past discrimination.164 Currently, it is 
unclear whether a single constitutional violation is sufficient to trigger 
preclearance and whether past discrimination may be considered.165 In light of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Shelby County, which stressed the 
importance of the Voting Rights Act targeting current voting discrimination 
problems, Congress should clarify the current standard by ensuring that more 
evidence is needed to submit jurisdictions to Section 3 preclearance than a 
single instance of discrimination or evidence based on past voting 
discrimination alone.166 This change would provide guidance and consistency to 
lower federal courts, which have varied over whether a single violation or 
repeated violations are necessary to submit a jurisdiction to preclearance.167  
An additional change that Congress should make to Section 3 is allowing 
the Department of Justice, civil rights groups, and other plaintiffs to bring 
Section 3 claims under the Voting Rights Act directly.168 Currently, it is unclear 
from the statutory language whether plaintiffs can bring Section 3 claims on 
their own or whether Section 3 is appropriate only as a form of relief under 
Section 2 or other sections of the Act.169 If Congress amended Section 3 to 
allow plaintiffs to bring these challenges directly rather than as a form of relief, 
then this could streamline the process of submitting a jurisdiction to 
preclearance under Section 3, resulting in greater efficiency for both courts and 
litigants. For instance, by allowing a plaintiff to prove a violation under Section 
3 directly, this would avoid requiring the court to determine both (1) the merits 
of a Section 2 violation (or other Voting Rights Act violations) and (2) whether 
relief is proper under Section 3 because the jurisdiction engaged in intentional 
discrimination.170 Most importantly, this change would allow aggrieved parties 
                                                                                                                       
 164 After the Court’s decision in Shelby County, it is relatively clear that any mechanism 
for submitting a jurisdiction that mainly relies on a jurisdiction’s history of discrimination 
may automatically be constitutionally doomed given the fate of Section 4’s formula.  
 165 Seidenberg, supra note 155. 
 166 Updating Section 3 to include this clarification may help avoid implicating this 
Section as constitutionally suspect under Shelby County because it would force judges to 
determine whether the claims against jurisdiction included proof of voting discrimination 
that reflected current discriminatory practices rather than trends rooted in historical tradition. 
 167 Pildes, supra note 71; see infra Appendix.  
 168 This may generally avoid confusion over how groups and individuals can obtain 
Section 3 relief. Based on the statute itself, it is unclear how a group or individual would 
seek a remedy under Section 3 because this part of the statute does not provide a direct cause 
of action for plaintiff’s seeking redress under Section 3’s preclearance regime. See infra 
Appendix.   
 169 See Pildes, supra note 71.  
 170 A jurisdiction may even willingly submit to Section 3 preclearance to avoid litigating 
the dispute by signing a consent decree agreement. Such decrees have commonly avoided 
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to bring direct proceedings under Section 3 that ask the appropriate court to 
place a jurisdiction under preclearance because of recent discrimination found 
in previous cases where evidence of intentional discrimination did not exist.171 
Again, this change would require very little of Congress, but would have a 
major effect on aggrieved plaintiffs’ ability to receive redress for findings of 
discrimination in past cases when Section 3 was only available as a remedial 
mechanism.  
While arguments can be made for clarifying or reigning-in judicial 
discretion under Section 3 in targeting preclearance requirements and 
determining sunset dates, this discretion is the likely reason these amendments 
to Section 3 would be insulated from constitutional challenges. Hence, 
Congress should not alter this aspect of Section 3. Because this discretion is 
vested with courts, it is likely that targeted preclearance requirements with 
sunset dates would not be subject to constitutional challenge for Congress 
imposing its own judgment on the scope if its own enforcement powers, as 
prohibited by Boerne, because these preclearance decisions ultimately rest with 
federal courts.172  
Finally, Congress should amend Section 3 by requiring a jurisdiction to 
initially demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it enacted the 
challenged law or provision for purposes other than discriminating against 
ethnic, racial, or language minorities.173 In some cases, the jurisdiction may not 
be able to provide sufficient evidence underlying the enactment of a strict voter 
identification law to meet the clear and convincing standard. However, even if 
most jurisdictions can overcome this burden by presenting evidence such as the 
need to prevent voter fraud and maintain public confidence in the electoral 
process, it will force these jurisdictions to provide evidence that justifies the 
challenged provisions that goes beyond mere pretext. Moreover, a jurisdiction 
faced with this initial evidentiary burden may be deterred from claiming that it 
was motivated to enact the statute to preserve the status of incumbents because 
this justification would require it to admit overt partisan bias underlying its 
voter identification law.  
Furthermore, this standard creates greater balance between parties, which 
remedies the numerous burdens placed on plaintiffs in the aftermath of Shelby 
County. Under this standard, the parties would share the burdens more equally 
because aggrieved plaintiffs must bear the costs associated with bringing the 
litigation while jurisdictions must meet the initial evidentiary burden by 
                                                                                                                       
the expense and time associated with litigation claims under the Voting Rights Act. See 
Crum, supra note 18, at 2014ԟ15. 
 171 Pildes, supra note 71.  
 172 For example, if Congress allowed jurisdictions to bail out of Section 3 preclearance 
after a specific period of time similar to that of Section 5 preclearance, these provisions 
could be constitutionally suspect under Boerne for Congress exceeding its enforcement 
powers. Hence, this problem would be avoided by keeping Section 3’s expansive discretion 
in the hands of the judiciary rather than the political branches. See infra Part V.C.  
 173 See infra Appendix.   
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providing evidence demonstrating a non-discriminatory purpose justifying their 
challenged law. As a result of this clear and convincing burden, jurisdictions 
may be less inclined to press ahead with the high costs associated with the 
litigation process and more likely to agree to consent decrees that would 
facilitate greater cooperation between the parties, avoid protracted disputes, and 
prevent discriminatory voting laws altogether.174 
B. Addressing Boerne and Results Test Critics  
Critics opposed to extending Section 3 preclearance to include a results test 
cite the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores as a major 
constitutional hurdle.175 Their basic premise is this: because Boerne held that 
laws passed by Congress under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers 
must be “congruent and proportional” to the constitutional injury sought to be 
remedied, allowing Congress to burden states with Section 3 preclearance 
requirements under a results test—for less than a constitutional injury—exceeds 
Congress’s enforcement power and thus violates Boerne’s “congruent and 
proportional” standard.176 
Although these critics’ skepticism is understandable, it rests on a number of 
premature assumptions that inappropriately preclude careful consideration of 
the results test’s true potential and forecloses meaningful discussion of this 
approach. First, these critics prematurely assume that the Supreme Court has 
already announced that Boerne’s heightened “congruent and proportional 
analysis” applies in the context of laws passed under Congress’s Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement powers. However, the Supreme Court has not decided 
this question and has not extended Boerne to laws passed under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.177 As a result, Katzenbach’s more deferential standard applying 
rational means review to laws passed by Congress under the Fifteenth 
                                                                                                                       
 174 Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform 
Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 726 (“The consent decree is a promising form of 
negotiation and compromise which holds out the hope that parties may achieve justice 
through peaceful, voluntary collaboration. Settlement through consent decrees . . . avoids the 
time, expense and risk of trial.”). 
 175 See Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on Proposed Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 
ELECTION L. BLOG, (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:32 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=58021, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8VFM-FH5C; Franita Tolson, The Importance of Tunnel Vision in Fixing 
the VRA’s Coverage Formula, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franita-
tolson/voting-rights-act-preclearance_b_4653095.html (last updated Mar. 25, 2014, 5:59 
AM), archived at http://perma.cc/989R-MYQR.  
 176 See Hasen, supra note 175. 
 177 See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 
205 (2009); Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future 
Jurisprudence of Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUS BLOG (June 25, 2013, 7:10 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-curious-disappearance- of- boerne- and- the- future-
jurisprudence-of-voting-rights-and-race/, archived at http://perma.cc/5JJN-6AXV.  
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Amendment arguably still applies to an amended Section 3 with a results test.178 
Accordingly, under Katzenbach’s standard, an amended Section 3 preclearance 
would fulfill this more deferential standard of review given that Section 3—
even with a lower standard of proof for submitting jurisdictions to 
preclearance—is rationally related to preventing jurisdictions from enacting 
voting laws discriminating against minorities. 
Second, the Court’s analysis in Shelby County did not even mention 
Boerne, and the Court did not cite this decision despite the fact that Shelby 
County argued in favor of extending Boerne’s heightened standard.179 While 
those who believe that the Court is destined to extend Boerne to the Fifteenth 
Amendment point to a footnote in Shelby County that refers to the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendment standards together, the Court’s reference is vague at 
best and even one critic admits that this footnote’s meaning is impossible to 
discern.180 In addition, the Court also declined to extend Boerne’s heightened 
standard to the Voting Rights Act and other laws passed under the Fifteenth 
Amendment in Northwest Austin even though this decision raised questions 
over Katzenbach’s viability.181  
Still, with two major opportunities to extend Boerne to the Voting Rights 
Act, the Court’s silence on Boerne’s scope may implicitly confirm that laws 
passed by Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment may be entitled to more 
deference under Katzenbach.182 In fact, examining Shelby County more closely 
shows that Justice Thomas may be less concerned with the level of deference 
given to Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment and more concerned with 
ensuring burdens imposed on the states are based on current conditions rather 
than historical practices.183 In Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts conceded 
that Congress amassed a sizeable record during its most recent reconsideration 
of the Voting Rights Act, which warranted its reauthorization in 2006.184 
Moreover, the Chief Justice explained that Congress could reactivate Section 5 
preclearance—a much more extensive intrusion on state sovereignty than an 
amended Section 3.185 
                                                                                                                       
 178 See South Carolina. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966). 
 179 See generally Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see Hasen, supra note 
177. 
 180 Hasen, supra note 177. 
 181 NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 204–06. 
 182 Even Justice Scalia has stated, “Congress’s enforcement power is broadest when 
directed ‘to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race.” Tennessee v. Lane, 
541 U.S. 509, 563 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 
130 (1970)); see also Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of 
Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. 
REV. 39, 98í99 (2006) (discussing how the Court may analyze City of Boerne in the context 
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 
 183 Shelby Cnty., 133. S. Ct. at 2631–33 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 184 See id. at 2629.  
 185 See id. at 2631.  
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Finally, critics of the results test rest their arguments on “predictive 
judgments” on how the Roberts Court would decide this Boerne issue, when the 
issue itself has not even been decided.186 Related to this point, critics’ 
assumptions rest on the notion that the Court’s composition will remain 
undisturbed forever. With Justices Scalia and Kennedy approaching eighty and 
the time it will take for a new Voting Rights Act challenge to reach the Court, 
critics automatically assume that Boerne’s extension to the Fifteenth 
Amendment context is imminent when in fact the Court’s ideological 
composure may change sooner rather than later. As a result, Katzenbach’s more 
deferential standard currently applicable to the Voting Rights Act should not be 
presumed as destined to fail. Although the Court may resolve whether Boerne 
extends to the Voting Rights Act in the near future, Shelby County still presents 
major questions over whether the Act’s remnants can continue to protect 
minorities at the ballot box. 
C. The Department of Justice Suits Inadequately Protect Minorities  
Perhaps the most profound change after Shelby County is the shifting of the 
burden to individual plaintiffs or the Department of Justice as the parties that 
must bring suits to enforce the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, these suits target 
laws that have already gone into effect rather than preventing them from going 
into effect as Section 5 preclearance once addressed. With considerable time 
and resources needed to challenge new voting laws, it is unlikely that individual 
plaintiffs will be able to challenge every possibly restrictive or discriminatory 
voting law. Thus, amending Section 3 by shifting the initial burden of proof to 
jurisdictions will restore greater balance between the parties when an aggrieved 
party challenges a jurisdiction’s voting laws.187 
In the suits against Texas and North Carolina, the Department of Justice has 
the burden of proving under Section 2 that minority voters generally have fewer 
opportunities than white voters to elect candidates of their choice.188 The 
Department of Justice’s suits against both Texas and North Carolina 
demonstrate why the remaining sections of the Voting Rights Act inadequately 
protect minorities and are an unrealistic post-Shelby County strategy. In Texas, 
the Department of Justice claims that the state legislature violated the Act by 
discriminating against African-American and Hispanic minorities.189 The 
Department relies on a Section 5 preclearance opinion by the D.C. District 
                                                                                                                       
 186 See Hasen, supra note 175.  
 187 See infra Appendix. 
 188 Richard L. Hasen, Why 2014 Will Be a Pivotal Year for Judicial Decisions About 
Voting Rights, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Dec. 2013), http://www.scholarsstrategy 
network.org/sites/default/files/ssn_basic_facts_hasen_on_why_2014_will_be_a_key_year_f
or_judicial_protection_of_voting_rights.pdf.  
 189 See Brief for Defendants at 1ԟ2, Perez v. Texas, No. CV- SA-11-CA-360-OLG-JES-
XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Texas-reply-on-Sec.-3-of-VRA-8-5-13.pdf. 
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Court issued before Shelby County that denied Texas the right to implement its 
new voter identification law because Texas could not show that it would not 
have a discriminatory effect.190 
The problem with the Department of Justice’s reliance on this decision is 
time. Because the D.C. District Court issued its decision before Shelby County, 
the court was forced to vacate its decision once the Supreme Court struck down 
Section 4’s preclearance formula. Thus, the Department of Justice must acquire 
independent evidence that Texas discriminated against racial or ethnic 
minorities when creating its new voter identification law. Furthermore, the 
Department of Justice’s Section 2 claims against Texas are unlikely to be 
successful because the state can legitimately claim it was motivated to change 
its voting laws for ensuring the integrity of the voting process or for preserving 
the incumbency of a political party.191 
For instance, as long as the Texas state legislature targeted Democrats, 
rather than targeting blacks or Hispanics because they are predominantly 
Democrats, the Texas law is likely constitutional—even though it likely burdens 
minorities at the ballot box. While the partisan reasons justifying Texas’s voter 
identification law seem tenuous, its likely success in this unfolding legal battle 
reveals why the Obama Justice Department’s strategy in the post-Shelby world 
is an unrealistic approach to solving the nation’s voting rights problems and 
why amending Section 3 is greatly needed.  
Although North Carolina has simply denied the allegations of racial animus, 
North Carolina’s Republican controlled legislature can similarly hide behind the 
pretext of discriminating against Democrats to preserve the incumbency of 
Republican office holders.192 The problem with this result is that the new voter 
                                                                                                                       
 190 Id.  
 191 This is exactly the State of Texas’s response. After the Department of Justice filed its 
suit in federal court, the State of Texas stated:  
[The] DOJ’s accusations of racial discrimination are baseless. In 2011, both houses 
of the Texas Legislature were controlled by large Republican majorities, and their 
redistricting decisions were designed to increase the Republican Party’s electoral 
prospects at the expense of the Democrats. It is perfectly constitutional for a 
Republican-controlled legislature to make partisan districting decisions, even if there are 
incidental effects on minority voters who support Democratic candidates.  
Id. at 19. 
 192 In doing so, North Carolina can probably avoid a court ruling that would find the 
state in violation of Section 2 of the Act by relying on political justifications and the 
argument that the state needs to prevent in-person voter fraud. Hence, the Department of 
Justice’s claim against North Carolina—in the absence of proof that Republican legislators 
passed the restrictive voting law with the aim of preventing racial minorities from voting—is 
likely to be unsuccessful in blocking the new provisions of the law. On another note, North 
Carolina claims it has a legitimate interest in preventing voter fraud, although it is likely that 
claim is yet another pretext for enacting this stringent voter identification law. See Tokaji, 
supra note 22, at 76–77. 
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identification law is still very likely to burden racial minorities and to make it 
more difficult for them to exercise their constitutional right to vote.193 
In terms of the Department of Justice’s claim to have Texas and North 
Carolina bailed in to Section 3 preclearance under the Act, the standard of proof 
is even higher; thus these suits are more unlikely to succeed. As explained, the 
Department of Justice must prove that Texas and North Carolina intentionally 
discriminated against racial minorities when moving forward with voter 
identification laws. Although judicial findings of intentional discrimination 
under the Act are not unheard of,194 this burden is exceedingly difficult to 
prove.195 Given the lack of legislators admitting their desire to prevent 
minorities from voting, the Department of Justice’s Section 3 claim is probably 
a move that is more symbolic than realistic.  
Additionally, these suits demonstrate why questions about Section 3’s scope 
need answering. Because federal courts have never used Section 3 to bail in a 
jurisdiction outside the context of redistricting, it is unclear how courts will 
grapple with Texas’s strict voter identification law. Further, it is currently 
unsettled how much intentional discrimination must be shown to warrant 
Section 3 preclearance and whether single constitutional violations are 
sufficient to trigger this Section. 196 On the other hand, it is also unclear whether 
past discrimination by a jurisdiction can be considered or whether only current, 
widespread discrimination can be taken into account.197 With these questions 
still unanswered and with Section 2 placing the burden on individual plaintiffs, 
Congress should take steps to update Section 3 by clarifying its scope and 
                                                                                                                       
 193 See Matt A. Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID Requirements 
on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 111, 115 (2009) 
(explaining how a significant portion of the Indiana eligible electorate does not possess valid 
photo identification); M.V. Hood III & Charles S. Bullock III, Worth a Thousand Words? An 
Analysis of Georgia’s Voter Identification Statutes, 36 AM. POL. RES. 555, 556–63 (2008) 
(finding that blacks and Hispanics are less likely to have photo identification); Michael J. 
Pitts & Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting Disfranchisement: Voter Identification During 
Indiana’s 2008 General Election, 25 J.L. & POL. 329, 348 (2009) (explaining how nearly 
900 ballots in the 2008 Indiana general election were not counted due to lack of photo 
identification); see also Tokaji, supra note 22, at 107í08.  
 194 See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings 
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 677 
(2006).  
 195 Usually, courts need rare “smoking gun” evidence such as secret recordings, emails, 
or specific statements that demonstrate that the jurisdiction intended to make it 
disproportionately harder and more burdensome for minorities to exercise their right to vote. 
Rapoport, supra note 19.  
 196 See Seidenberg, supra note 155. For instance, it is unclear whether emails that 
indicate intentional discrimination by a government official could actually represent the 
views of the legislature itself and thus constitutes discriminatory intent or whether more 
extensive proof of intentional discrimination needs to be more widespread in order to be 
attributed to the intent of the legislature itself. See id. 
 197 Id.  
2014] FINDING LIFE IN HURRICANE SHELBY 1001 
 
making it easier for the Department of Justice to submit jurisdictions to 
preclearance.  
D. Congress Should Abandon Section 5 Preclearance  
Although several members of Congress introduced legislation that would 
update Section 4’s preclearance formula in January 2014,198 this is an 
undesirable solution even if such legislation lowers the standard of proof under 
Section 3.199 Instead, Congress should amend Section 3 by broadening its scope 
and thus “replacing” Section 5 with Section 3 preclearance altogether. This 
approach has a number of advantages.200  
From a policy standpoint, Section 4’s formula for targeting which 
jurisdictions must submit to preclearance under Section 5 is overly complex and 
                                                                                                                       
 198 See Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R. 3899, 113th Cong. (2014). This 
proposed legislation would create a new coverage formula for Section 4, which would revive 
Section 5 preclearance. 
States with five violations of federal law to their voting changes over the past fifteen 
years will have to submit future election changes for federal approval. This new formula 
would currently apply to Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Local jurisdictions 
would be covered if they commit three or more violations. 
Ari Berman, Members of Congress Introduce a New Fix for the Voting Rights Act, NATION 
(Jan. 16, 2014, 12:53 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/177962/members-congress-
introduce-new-fix-voting-rights-act#, archived at http://perma.cc/4A8P-A432. However, as 
a compromise, objections by the Department of Justice against voter identification laws will 
not count as a new violation of the law, which would not provide a solution to the ongoing 
disputes in Texas and North Carolina. See id.; see also David Weigel, The New Voting 
Rights Act Fix Would Protect Voter ID Laws, So Should Liberals Hate It?, SLATE (Jan. 16, 
2014, 2:20 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2014/01/16/the_new_voting_rights_act 
_fix_would_protect_voter_id_laws_so_should_liberals.html, archived at http://perma.cc 
/9NB6-754V.  
 199 The new legislation introduced by members of Congress does in fact lower the 
standard of proof for Section 3 preclearance. See H.R. 3899, § 3(b)(4). However, this Note 
argues that Section 3 should be the “new Section 5” as the replacement of this provision 
rather than updating both. For this principal reason and others, this Note differs from the 
legislation currently pending in Congress.  
 200 Among the advantages to updating Section 3 are: (1) Compiling the data needed to 
determine Section 4’s preclearance formula is very burdensome and time consuming – 
especially if the formula requires periodic updating; (2) Section 3 is permanent provision of 
the Act and would not come under constitutional attack similar to each time Section 4 
requires reauthorization; (3) Section 3 allows judges the flexibility and discretion in 
fashioning preclearance requirements to specific problems found in the jurisdiction; (4) the 
flexibility provided under Section 3 can avoid the burdens of preclearance that requires a 
jurisdiction to submit all changes to its voting laws; and (5) Section 3 provides local federal 
district courts the discretion to fashion preclearance requirements and avoid concerns over 
partisans in the Department of Justice abusing preclearance.  
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burdensome and could be avoided by updating Section 3 instead.201 For 
instance, because Sections 4 and 5 are temporary, Congress would be forced to 
update Section 4’s formula often enough for the Act to reflect modern voting 
practices in order for it remain constitutional under Shelby County. However, 
Section 3’s preclearance provisions are permanent. Thus, broadening the scope 
of Section 3 would save Congress the burden of periodically worrying about 
refashioning Section 4’s formula to remain constitutional.  
Two interrelated points support broadening Section 3 while abandoning 
Section 5. First, Section 3 allows judges the flexibility and discretion in 
fashioning preclearance requirements to address specific problems found in the 
state or jurisdiction.202 Second, Section 3 allows judges flexibility in 
determining how long the jurisdiction has to submit to preclearance based on 
the alleged violations of the Voting Rights Act.203 As a related benefit, the 
judge has the discretion to require the jurisdiction to only submit its voter 
identification laws for preclearance—not every single change made to the 
jurisdiction’s election laws as Section 5 required.204 By relying on Section 3’s 
targeted preclearance standards, jurisdictions would no longer be burdened with 
submitting all changes to federal officials in Washington, D.C., before these 
changes go into effect. Likewise, an amended Section 3 would force federal 
judges to focus on actual and recent instances of discrimination rather than a 
jurisdiction’s history of discrimination as relied upon by Section 4’s formula—
an aspect sharply criticized by the majority in Shelby County. 
On a different point, Section 3 preclearance remedies the Court’s concerns 
raised in Shelby County about Section 5’s intrusion into state and local 
government’s sovereignty to enact voting law changes. In other words, Section 
3 avoids concerns about Section 5’s overinclusive requirements that 
jurisdictions submit all voting law changes for review by requiring a 
jurisdiction to submit only those voting laws in which it has a proven problem. 
Moreover, Section 3’s flexibility provides federal judges with the discretion to 
determine how long jurisdictions must submit to preclearance.205 This aspect of 
Section 3 could prevent problems related to the length of time states or local 
                                                                                                                       
 201 See Pildes, supra note 71. Because the most recent formula originally passed in 1972 
was premised on ballot access rather than second-generation barriers to voting, it is not 
immediately clear what criteria should be used to update Section 4’s formula to replace the 
main requirements with a substitute that would adequately target jurisdictions that make it 
more difficult for minorities to vote rather than blocking access entirely. See id. 
 202 See id.  
 203 For example, if the jurisdiction has a history of enacting restrictive voter 
identification laws, Section 3 allows judges the discretion to target the types of laws the 
jurisdiction must submit to preclearance and the time period in which the jurisdiction must 
do so. This aspect of Section 3’s judicial remedy avoids burdening a jurisdiction with 
preclearance requirements for a period of time that may far exceed the actual need for 
federal monitoring and intervention. See Crum, supra note 18, at 2010ԟ15.   
 204 See id. at 2007. 
 205 See Crum supra note 18, at 2013.  
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jurisdictions have to submit to preclearance under Section 5 before qualifying 
for a bailout.206 
Finally, improving Section 3 is more advantageous than updating Section 4 
because Section 3 provides local federal district courts the discretion to fashion 
preclearance requirements. Instead of a federal district court in Washington, 
D.C., or DOJ authorities deciding preclearance determinations as required under 
Section 5, pocket trigger preclearance places these determinations in the hands 
of local federal judges where the action is filed. Placing this discretion in the 
hands of local federal judges rather than officials in Washington, D.C., could 
alleviate concerns over federal officials deciding preclearance determinations 
based on the typical partisanship known to characterize the Department of 
Justice rather than the merits of the preclearance claims.207 Instead, Section 3 
would prevent such abuse by placing the disputes in the hands of federal judges 
who are likely to assess the merits of claims and determine whether a 
jurisdiction should be submitted to preclearance more fairly and 
independently.208 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Shelby County is destined to become one of this decade’s most polarizing 
and criticized decisions issued by the Supreme Court. As the Department of 
Justice’s litigation against North Carolina and Texas continues to unfold, the 
high standard of proof currently required to submit these jurisdictions to Section 
3 preclearance demonstrates the inadequacy of these suits in protecting voters 
such as Alberta Currie. Moreover, poll workers may be forced to turn away 
many others trying to exercise their right to vote for not providing satisfactory 
forms of photo identification. Other states across the South or other parts of the 
country may pass similar voter identification laws with stringent requirements.  
However, resurrecting Section 5 preclearance by updating Section 4’s 
coverage formula—while popular and currently proposed by members of 
Congress—is the improper solution. To avoid continual constitutional attack 
and partisan influence in the Department of Justice, Section 3 needs 
comprehensive reform to serve as a replacement to Section 5 preclearance. 
                                                                                                                       
 206 Under Section 5 preclearance, jurisdictions could not bail out unless they could prove 
they complied with the Act for ten years, which resulted in jurisdictions submitting to 
preclearance for an amount of time that may have far extended the jurisdiction’s tendencies 
to engage in discrimination over the same period of time. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012). 
 207 See Edward Blum et al., Who’s Playing Politics?, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 24, 2006, 8:29 
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/216584/whos-playing-politics/edward-blum, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5CBQ-56RF (describing how staffers in the Department of 
Justice have frequently utilized the Voting Rights Act for partisan ends).  
 208 Federal judges are required to recuse themselves if their impartiality could 
reasonably be questioned, which may result in the adjudication of Section 3 cases in a more 
impartial manner than currently handled by the Department of Justice. See M. Margaret 
McKeown, To Judge or Not to Judge: Transparency and Recusal in the Federal System, 30 
REV. LITIG. 653, 661 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006)). 
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Amending Section 3’s standard of proof to allow preclearance for both 
intentional and effects-based discrimination by including a results test is a step 
in the right direction in preventing Shelby County from denying access to the 
ballot box. Further, clarifying this Section’s scope and changing its initial 
evidentiary burden will provide judges and litigants with greater clarity and will 
equalize the burdens shared by parties in these disputes. Without such 
comprehensive reforms, the threat to Alberta Currie and countless other voters 
is both real and pressing. 
 
APPENDIX: MODEL AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 3 OF THE VOTING  
RIGHTS ACT 
Below is an amended version of Section 3 that reflects this Note’s 
recommendations. The statute has been reorganized, and new language has been 
inserted. The new text is denoted in italics.   
 
 
1. If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or an aggrieved 
person under: 
 
(a) any statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision; or 
 
(b) this section directly 
 
2. The court finds: 
 
(a) violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment by finding repeated 
violations of recent, significant discrimination; or  
 
(b) the challenged law or provisions results in a denial or abridgement of 
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color; 
and 
 
3. Such findings justify equitable relief within the territory of such State or 
political subdivision, then: 
 
4. The court, in addition to such relief as it may grant, shall retain 
jurisdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate and during such period 
no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the time 
the proceeding was commenced shall be enforced unless and until: 
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(a) The court finds that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, 
or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the voting guarantees set forth in [the language minority provision] of this title: 
Provided,  
 
(b) That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure 
may be enforced if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or 
procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate 
official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney 
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission, 
except that neither the court's finding nor the Attorney General's failure to 
object shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, 
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. 
 
5. For the purposes of this section, the jurisdiction has the initial burden of 
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the challenged law or 
provision was enacted for a purpose or effect other than discriminating against 
a racial, ethnic, or language minority group. If the jurisdiction meets this 
burden, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof found in Part 2 of this section. 
 
       
